The Impact of Brexit on EU Development Policy by Price, Sophia
www.ssoar.info
The Impact of Brexit on EU Development Policy
Price, Sophia
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Price, S. (2019). The Impact of Brexit on EU Development Policy. Politics and Governance, 7(3), 72-82. https://
doi.org/10.17645/pag.v7i3.2149
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur




This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463)
2019, Volume 7, Issue 3, Pages 72–82
DOI: 10.17645/pag.v7i3.2149
Article
The Impact of Brexit on EU Development Policy
Sophia Price
Politics and International Relations, Leeds Beckett University, Leeds, LS1 3HE, UK; E-Mail: sophia.price@leedsbeckett.ac.uk
Submitted: 3 March 2019 | Accepted: 15 July 2019 | Published: 16 September 2019
Abstract
Brexit is likely to herald fundamental changes in the operation, scope and practice of EU development policy, due to the
UK’s key role in leading and defining the geographical and sectoral remit of policy, and through its provision of large-scale
funding. Through a focus on the EU’s relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States, this article
explores these potential impacts. It highlights the importance of the timing of Brexit in relation to the contemporaneous
renegotiation of EU–ACP relations and the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework and argues that the focus on static im-
pacts of Brexit, in terms of removing the UK from the ‘EU equation’, overlooks the broader dynamics of political economy
in which it is situated. Through the analysis of the anticipatory adjustments and discursive dynamics in EU development
policy that articulate the pursuit of material interests, the article helps understand both the dynamics of Brexit and the
broader transformations in which it is located.
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1. Introduction
This article draws on the central themes of this Special
Issue to explore the impact of Brexit on EU Development
Policy, with a specific focus on EU–Africa, Caribbean
and Pacific (ACP) relations. Drawing on a materialist
political economy approach, the core argument high-
lights the need to understand EU development relations
within their broader context, both in terms of colonial
and post-colonial structures and the expansion of the
world market. It follows Rosamond’s (2016, p. 869) en-
treaty to study the EU within, rather than isolation from,
the broader dynamics of political economy in which it
is situated.
Development policy provides a fruitful field in which
to explore the impact of Brexit. It necessarily entails the
analysis of both the internal and external dimensions
of European integration/disintegration. EU development
policy is an example of an area of mixed competences
between the EU institutions and member states, which
has experienced increasing Europeanisation whilst also
being greatly influenced by the UK, in terms of fund-
ing, policy leadership, expertise and geographical orien-
tation. A specific focus on the EU–ACP relationship pro-
vides evidence of these themes, and particularly the lega-
cies of colonialism and pressures of ongoing neoliberal
restructuring. In particular the current renegotiation of
the EU–ACP Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) pro-
vides a useful early test of such impacts on EU develop-
ment policy, as it has coincided both with preparations
for Brexit and internal EU budgetary negotiations for the
next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). As such it
reveals the anticipatory adjustments made by key actors
in preparation for the departure of the UK, most notably
EU Member states, EU and ACP institutional actors, and
associated political and societal interests.
Existing literature on the impact of Brexit on EUdevel-
opment policy has tended to focus on static impacts, par-
ticularly in relation to the funding and policy leadership
gaps left by the UK’s exit. In these terms static impacts
refer to the assumed effects on development policy and
policy making of simply removing the UK from the ‘EU
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equation’ (De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2019; Jensen& Snaith,
2018). This article explores this by demonstrating how
the Commission and certain member states are utilising
the confluence of the renegotiation of the EU–ACP rela-
tionship, the MFF and the removal of the UK from this
area of policy making, to enhance the Commission’s role
in themanagement of development policy. As the UK has
historically opposed this integrative pressure, Brexit has
provided opportunity to reignite this agenda.
Whilst recognising the importance of the institu-
tional challenges and changes provoked by Brexit, this
article however argues for a broader analysis which high-
lights the more fundamental shifts that are reflective
and constitutive of disintegration. It points to the an-
ticipatory adjustments already underway in EU develop-
ment policy that indicate its dynamic effects, for exam-
ple the changing preferences and strategies in relation
to the geographical and sectoral focus of development
policy. Further evidence of such dynamism is the promo-
tion of interests clearly aligned to EU self-interest, de-
fined both as the promotion of EU core policy concerns
linked to development, particularly around security and
control of migration, and in the material interests in pro-
moting business expansion and the development of mar-
kets associated and linked to European capital. The arti-
cle argues this is represented by the discursive dynam-
ics that explicitly justify the use of development coop-
eration in self-interested terms. In doing so it reveals
the discursive and material struggles emerging as the EU
seeks to reframe and promote its own interests along-
side UK attempts to reconfigure itself as Global Britain,
and throws light on the impact of disintegration on the
global role of the EU and its future relations with the UK.
Importantly it asserts that that the pursuit of key mate-
rial and ideational interests in the external relations of
the EU and its member states is not new, but is reliant on
and reproduces inequitable historic and social conditions
that structure contemporary North–South relations.
This argument acknowledges the intertwined rela-
tionship between ideas, discourse and their material un-
derpinnings. There is a substantial focus on discourse
in materialist approaches. For example, in Gramscian
terms, ideas combinedwith institutional forms andmate-
rial capabilities, are central to hegemony and dominant
social formations. Marx and Engels highlighted how class
rule shapes the ruling ideas of each age, and forewarned
against their presentation as being in the universal inter-
est (Marx & Engels, 1974). Ideas and discourse are there-
fore powerful in both reproducing class relations and
concealing their contradictions. The policy discourses
within development relationships frequently contain, ob-
scure and further particular material interests, which are
presented as if they are of wider benefit. In contem-
porary development policy, discourse serves to obscure
long-running inequalities associated with the continuing
legacies of colonialism as well as more immediate as-
pects of the desires of different blocs (including national
blocs) of capital for particular forms of investment and
trade flows. This has implications for intra-capitalist com-
petition, for the unequal relationship between capital
and labour and a host of other unequal resource and
power relations on the basis of gender, nationality and
race. Policy discourse and its critical deconstruction then,
is of central importance formaterialist scholars who seek
to answer the crucial question of ‘who benefits?’.
In order to explore these debates the article first sit-
uates EU development policy within a political economy
framework, in order to properly locate the analysis of
Brexit within the context of crisis and associated pres-
sures of the expansion of globalmarkets. It then explores
the relevance of the EU–ACP relationship to the study of
both EU development policy and more broadly the pro-
cesses of EU integration, by highlighting reform of the re-
lationship from a neo-colonial to neo-liberal framework
and the agency of the UKwithin that. In doing so it draws
attention to the scalar significance of the relationship,
which links 107 states and over 1.5 billion people across
the world through its trade and aid provisions. It also
highlights the importance of this particular conjuncture
in which the renegotiation of the relationship has coin-
cided with both the EU’s internal processes of reorder-
ing its future financial mechanisms and the disintegra-
tive forces of Brexit. By understanding the particular con-
temporary context in which the EU–ACP relationship is
located, we are better able to assess the likely impacts
of the collision of these forces. In doing so the article
explores current debates about the impact of Brexit on
development policy in terms of their preoccupation with
static impacts. This section focuses on both the inter-
nal funding and policy leadership gaps created through
Brexit and opportunistic attempts to increase the role
and power of the EU institutions in response. In contrast,
Section 5 develops the analysis of the dynamic impacts
of Brexit through a focus on the anticipatory adjustments
evident in the current renegotiation of the EU–ACP rela-
tionship and the changing geographical and sectoral fo-
cus of EU development policy. By exploring the framing
of a post-Brexit EU development policy as the securing
of EU self-interest in the context of Brexit, the article
argues that the disintegrative moment of the UK’s de-
cision to leave the EU has provided an opportunity for
the EU to readjust its external focus and influence to
the exigencies of a changing and increasingly competitive
global economy.
2. The Political Economy of EU Development Policy
Colonialism is deep in the DNA of EU development pol-
icy. As Nicolaïdis (2015, pp. 285–296) argues, European
amnesia allows this colonial legacy to be overlooked in
the framings of current forms of development coopera-
tion relations, permitting the EU to distance itself from
its past whilst also seeking to secure continuity and col-
lective management of a colonial world slipping out of
the grasp of its individual member states. Development
policy has been a key mechanism by which the EU
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has maintained existing patterns of production and ex-
change, albeit within a broader commitment to multi-
scalar neo-liberalisation. As such policy commitments to
global frameworks of sustainability and poverty reduc-
tion, as embodied in the Sustainable Development Goals
and the post-2015 consensus, are combined with mech-
anisms that seek to manage processes of world market
expansion and generalised competitiveness within state-
society complexes throughout the Global South, and si-
multaneously within the EU itself (Price & Nunn, 2016,
p. 454). This is pursued internally through the broad-
ening and deepening of its internal market, and exter-
nally through trade liberalisation and development co-
operation relations, exposing labour and capital both
within the EU and in its partners to increased competi-
tion (Price & Nunn, 2016, p. 462). That this produces po-
larising and uneven effects is recognised by the EU and
so it provides specific development policy mechanisms,
such as Aid for Trade (AfT), to offset the damaging effects
of neo-liberalisation.
A measure of the importance of this policy domain
to the EU’s attempts to position itself within a chang-
ing global economy has been the ongoing attempts to
increase supranational competence within the design
and management of EU development policy. Since the
turn of the new millennium there has been a range
of initiatives to embed a European development pol-
icy both centrally and within the member states’ own
policy frameworks. The EU believes that the collectivi-
sation of development policy strengthens its global ac-
torness and provides “added value, in terms of political
and financial leverage, that is larger than the sum of in-
dividual Member State actions” (European Commission
& High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy [EC & HRUFASP], 2016a, p. 2). While
Orbie and Carbone (2016) point to the limited provision
bywayof a formalacquis communautaire that bindmem-
ber states in this area, the 2005 European Consensus
on Development and 2011 Agenda for Change stand out
in setting common principles and practices, accompa-
nied by specific institutions and budgetary instruments
through which European development policy is man-
aged. Delputte, Lannoo, Orbie and Verschaeve (2019)
state that while the EU has had an ‘outspoken commit-
ment’ to both influencing its member states’ policies
and fostering an enhanced European development pol-
icy, pressures for increased Europeanisation have been
countered by the endurance of differing member state
preferences and national priorities, the relatively weak
institutional mechanisms that underpin the EU approach
to development and sub-groupings of states that share
differing ideas and priorities. However, rather than view-
ing these as competing binary distinctions between the
national and supranational characteristics, authors such
as Smith (2016, p. 141) argue that the processes of
(re)nationalisations, Europeanisation and globalisation
occur in complex co-existence,with the interplay of struc-
tures, norms and practices at a variety of scales underpin-
ning the shape and operation of EU development policy.
An empirical focus on the EU–ACP relationship provides
a lens through which to both understand this complexity
and the potential effects Brexit will produce.
3. The EU–ACP Relationship
The EU–ACP relationship is rooted in the colonial past
of EU member states, and reflects attempts to secure
continuity and collective management of colonies and
former colonies within the context of both the wide-
ranging transitions to independence across the Global
South and the deepening and widening of European in-
tegration. Originally signed in 1975, in the wake of UK
accession, the EU–ACP partnership built on the 1957
Treaty of Rome and subsequent Yaoundé Conventions
(1964–1975) which provided for the association of the
colonial and post-colonial relations of the original six
European Economic Community (EEC) member states.
On the accession of the UK, these agreements were re-
formulated into the Lomé Conventions to accommodate
the UK’s external relations, particularly its colonies and
former colonies in the Caribbean and Anglophone Africa,
with the ACP created as a group of states to ‘partner’
and negotiate with the EU. The UK was therefore cen-
tral to the creation of the EU–ACP partnership, and has
subsequently been a key actor in the ongoing reform of
that relationship.
The first Lomé Convention reflected broader global
initiatives to address structural inequalities in the Global
Economy, as embodied in the United Nations New
International Economic Order (NIEO). This included de-
velopmental provisions, in particular non-reciprocal pref-
erential trade agreements and commodity stabiliza-
tion mechanisms. Development assistance was provided
through the bespoke European Development Fund (EDF)
and was not linked to the forms of economic and politi-
cal conditionalities that would later define EU aid provi-
sion. The EDF has endured as the key EU–ACP aid fund-
ing mechanism, sitting outside the European budget and
funded directly by member state contributions.
The scale and scope of this relationship has changed
over time, not least with the widening of both groups
to now encompass 79 ACP states, 28 EU member states
and 1.5 billion people. It has undergone continued pres-
sures to liberalise culminating in the replacement of
the Lomé Conventions by the CPA in 2000. This re-
structuring has locked-in longstanding commitments to
neo-liberal reform, based on regionalisation and the
restructuring of state-society relationships across the
ACP. Non-reciprocal trade preferences were replaced by
Free Trade Agreements, known as Economic Partnership
Agreements (EPAs), between the EU and ACP regional
groupings. Aid provision transformed from ‘project’ to
‘programmed aid’ and became increasingly conditional
on structural adjustment commitments, good gover-
nance, respect for human rights, democracy and trans-
parency. A specific focus was placed on AfT and Private
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Sector Development (PSD), with the EU providing 22.5
billion in AfT between 2005 and 2013 (EC & HRUFASP,
2016b, p. 61). This emphasis on the provision of funding
to support trade reform and economic restructuring ev-
idences the EU’s concern to offset the negative impacts
of neo-liberalisation.
In spite of a rhetorical commitment to trade liberali-
sation as a route to poverty reduction and economic de-
velopment, this has had limited impact on pre-existing
colonial patterns of trade. Trade diversification, indus-
trialisation strategies and PSD has been limited (EC &
HRUFASP, 2016b, p. 59). The EU remains a major trading
partner for the ACP (accounting for 24% of their imports
and 17% of their exports), and while the ACP as a block
has maintained a trade surplus with the EU this is due
to the predominance of African mineral exports (EC &
HRUFASP, 2016b, p. 58). ACP agricultural trade remains
dependent on primary commodities with little increase
in processed, value added products, while the ACP trade
surplus fell from €5 billion to €3 Billion between 2004
and 2014 (EC & HRUFASP, 2016b, p. 59). With the cur-
rent CPA due to conclude in 2020, the EU undertook an
extensive evaluation exercise which revealed the limited
impact that the CPA has had on poverty reduction, in-
equality and growth distribution (EC & HRUFASP, 2016b,
p. 93). There has been limited success in the promotion
of inclusive growth, in increasing the level of economic
participation of the poor and in tackling the root causes
of conflict (EC &HRUFASP, 2016b, p. 120).Moreover, civil
society actors, NGOs and domestic ACP businesses have
coalesced in anti-EPAmovements, recognising the threat
posed to their economies from the unrestrained access
of large-scale EU enterprises to their markets. While do-
mestic resistance has limited progress on the EPA agenda,
the EU has continued to press for the liberalisation of
ACP economies.
The contestations arising from the outcomes and ef-
fects of EU development policy have not dampened the
commitment of either the EU or the ACP to negotiate
a successor to the CPA after its expiry in 2020. From
an institutional perspective, the EU regards the CPA as
providing particular value as a single, predictable, long-
term, legally-binding framework with underlying values
and principles and a wide-range of instruments, which
is ratified by all ACP countries and allows critical mass
in financial resources (EC & HRUFASP, 2016b, p. 132).
This has driven the EU’s ongoing commitment to the
agreement and its replacement. The post-Cotonou ne-
gotiations were begun in 2018, but it could not have
been foreseen when the original agreement was signed
in 2000, that these would be conducted in the context
of the UK’s decision to leave the EU and in conditions of
such uncertainty.
4. Exploring the Static Impacts of Brexit
Existing literature on the impact of Brexit on EU
Development Policy has tended to focus on static effects
by scenario planning the effect of removing the UK from
the “EU equation” (Jensen & Snaith, 2018). Such analy-
ses rely on understandings of EU’s policy-makingmachin-
ery based on its past behaviour (De Ville & Siles-Brügge,
2019) and reflects the tendency of neo-functionalism
and (liberal) intergovernmentalism to imagine the EU
as “institutionally resilient”, and of institutionalist ap-
proaches to emphasise the “‘stickiness’ of institutional
equilibria” (Rosamond, 2016, p. 866). In this vein, Henökl
(2018, p. 64) builds a new institutionalist analysis which
highlights the challenges Brexit poses for EU develop-
ment policy, including existing legal obligations, budget
shortfalls, securing business continuity, policy realign-
ment, and representation and membership of interna-
tional fora. Drawing on an analysis of differentiated in-
tegration and regional disintegration, possible scenarios
are outlined for post-Brexit EU–UK cooperation which
could structure the future of EU development policy.
These scenarios are either total rupture and disinte-
gration; selective involvement in some agreements; or
strong UK engagement through participation in existing
relations (Henökl, 2018, p. 65). The sequenced nature
of the Brexit negotiations which requires the approval
of the Withdrawal Agreement before the future shape
of the UK–EU relationship is agreed, means that at the
time of writing this remains undefined. As such, this pro-
cess of disintegration has an unknown destination and
a variety of different policy outcomes (De Ville & Siles-
Brügge, 2019)
This indeterminacy provokes scenario planning
based on the UK’s central role in development policy and
funding, and the manner in which UK’s colonial legacy,
particularly its relations with the Commonwealth, have
historically shaped this area of EU policy and condition
future interests of both the EU and UK. Brexit therefore
raises questions about the EU’s capacity to maintain co-
herence after losing the UK as a coordinator and policy
innovator, and the future financing and shape of develop-
ment cooperation. As such, it brings a threat of instability
in EU external relations and possibly an overall reduc-
tion in the EU’s significance as a global actor. However,
opportunities have also been created for member states,
institutional and societal actors and third countries to
adapt their preferences and behaviour to the absence of
the UK. An exploration of the specifities of the EU–ACP
relationship in relation to gaps left by the removal of the
UK throws some light on the analysis of the static, and
more dynamic, impacts of Brexit.
4.1. The Funding Gap
In material terms, the loss of UK contributions to EU de-
velopment funding will pose a particular challenge for
the remaining 27 Member States. The EDF has histor-
ically been reliant on UK funding, with it contributing
€4.5 billion to the current 11th EDF. This constitutes ap-
proximately 15% of the total EDF, making the UK the
third largest contributor (after Germany’s €6.28 billion,
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and France’s €5.43 billion) (DFID, 2013; EU Commission,
2013). Due to the funding cycle, member states contri-
butions to the 11th EDF were due in 2018, giving par-
ticular importance to the negotiation of the Withdrawal
Agreement and the associated financial ‘divorce’ settle-
ment, although there was little public discussion of on-
going aid commitments within this. The lack of provi-
sions for a contributor to leave the EDF brought un-
certainty, however in 2017 it was confirmed the UK
would remain party to the Fund and maintain its exist-
ing modalities of payments until it left the EU, with the
2018Withdrawal Agreement (Articles 129 and 152) mak-
ing explicit this commitment to Cotonou’s institutional
structure and funding obligations (EU Commission, 2017;
UK Government, 2018). This pragmatic solution repre-
sents path dependency and institutional binding resul-
tant from the joint institutions and international legal ba-
sis of the CPA.
In the context of Brexit and Cotonou’s legal agree-
ment ending in 2020, the impact of the loss of UK
funding is less certain, particularly given the declin-
ing aid commitments of the remaining 27 EU member
states. Between 2010 and 2015 Belgium, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain enacted cuts to
their aid provision.While there have been some expecta-
tions that the remaining member states would compen-
sate of the loss of UK funding, this is uncertain (Castillejo
et al., 2018, p. 13). As the EDF has its own legal and
institutional basis, it could operate as a ‘pan-European
development fund’ (Olivie & Perez, 2017, p. 34) giving
the UK opportunity to continue to provide funds as a
third party. The UK has signalled it is considering the po-
tential for continued funding of EU development instru-
ments, in return for an appropriate yet unspecified role
in decisionmaking (European Scrutiny Committee, 2018).
However, this is unlikely to be agreed while the negotia-
tions for Brexit, the MFF and the successor to the CPA
are ongoing.
4.2. The Policy Leadership Gap
Historically, the UK has shown significant leadership
in development policy making, with the Department
for International Development (DFID) recognised as a
leading development actor. Sherriff, Head of European
External Action Programme argued that “the UK has had
an influence on the EU’s focus and expertise on the
0.7% target for aid, the SDGs [Sustainable Development
Goals], the value for money and results agenda, differ-
entiation in EU aid to focus more on least development
countries and fragile states” (Laporte, Sherriff, Hauck, &
Bilal, 2016). The UK led innovations in the CPA, partic-
ularly the marriage of social policies with trade liber-
alisation. UK policy makers considered themselves ‘de-
terminant actors’ in the allocation of EU aid to Least
Developed Countries (LDCs), the introduction of trans-
parency as well as “result-orientation” in aid manage-
ment and in raising awareness of gender issues (Olivie &
Perez, 2017, p. 21). Haastrup,Wright andGuerrina (2019)
argued that the UK has consistently shown leadership in
the integration of gender perspectives in development
cooperation, to a greater extent than other EU member
states or institutions.
The UK proved adept at leveraging EU development
provision to achieve DFID’s own objectives and national
goals, and through the collectivisation of aid, opera-
tionalised its impact more extensively than it could have
done through bilateral mechanisms (UK Government,
2013). DFID’s Multilateral Review (MAR) ranked the
EDF 11 out of 43 multilateral organisations for ‘good
value for money’. This analysis rested on its close align-
ment with DFID policy, its critical role in meeting inter-
national development objectives, and its capacity to ex-
tend the reach of UK aid to areas where the UK had a
limited and declining aid presence, or where DFID did
not operate (DFID, 2013; Watkins, 2016). Furthermore,
the UK played a strong coordinating role in the align-
ment of national, regional and global policy. The UK
was at the forefront of coordinating EU policy with the
Millennium Development Goals, the SDGs and the post-
2015 Agenda, forging partnerships with ‘like-minded’
states (e.g., Nordic States, Ireland, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg) to develop a collective approach that pro-
moted a particular form of development and empha-
sising the benefits and efficiency of collective action
(Watkins, 2016). Through such coalitions it played a lead-
ing role in the 2005 EU consensus on Development
and built momentum for the legal basis for develop-
ment policy in the Lisbon Treaty (Castillejo et al., 2018,
p. 13), whilst also promoting its own priorities at a global
level. This underpins the findings of the Independent
Commission on Aid Impact (2015) that DFID has signifi-
cant influence in the multilateral system.
In the facilitation and coordination of consensus
across various groupings, the UK acted as a pivotal out-
lier. Carbone (2012, p. 5) notes that achieving consensus
between members states was difficult due to compet-
ing preferences. France and Belgium, for example, pri-
oritised their former colonies while others (e.g., Italy,
Greece and Central Europe) focused on their immediate
neighbours. While the UK played key roles within and
between different EU coalitions, there have been ques-
tions about the extent to which it has maintained its cen-
trality. There is evidence that the UK has become more
of an ‘outlier’ across time. Sheriff stated that “EU devel-
opment policy was in a state of evolution even before
Brexit, moving to be more aligned with EU self-interest
and the SDGs” (Laporte et al., 2016). While others ar-
gue that there is a ‘strategic deficit’ in political leader-
ship in development policy, they point to new coalitions
and interests forming in response to the loss of the UK
as a powerful development policy actor (Castillejo et al.,
2018, p. 13). Therefore, rather than static responses to
the policy leadership gap, this might be an early indica-
tion of more dynamic effects emerging.
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4.3. EDF Reform and Increased ‘Europeanisation’
Reform of the EDF provides a key test of the static
impacts of Brexit. Historically, the UK was opposed to
Commission proposals to incorporate the EDF into the EU
budget, fearing an increase of the Commission’s role and
the loss of national control. In contrast the Commission
has been keen to establish itself as a ‘front runner’ in
the SDGs and has sought to reposition itself by advocat-
ing for strong coordination mechanisms to monitor EU
and member states activities and the development of a
‘whole of government’ approach (European Commission,
2019, pp. 4, 55). This gives weight to institutionalist ac-
counts of Brexit being a critical juncture that gives rise to
radical institutional change.
Commission attempts to augment its role in this mo-
ment of flux has been met by a lack of consensus and op-
position by some member states (Castillejo et al., 2018,
p. 10). While there is support for reforming the status
quo, there is division over the shape that change should
take (Castillejo et al., 2018, p. 10). As with the UK, France,
Poland and Hungary have opposed budgetisation, while
Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain and Finland,
have been supportive, regarding this as a move to har-
monised and coherent external action (Castillejo et al.,
2018, pp. 6–10). A further section of member states,
broadly described as ‘more Eurosceptic’, want an overall
reduction of the MFF, a reprioritisation of spending, and
a focus on adding value (Castillejo et al., 2018, p. 6).
In the context of the removal of the UK from the
‘EU equation’ the Commission has reinvigorated its pro-
posals to budgetise the EDF and radically reform aid
mechanisms as part of the 2021–2027 MFF. Alongside
bringing the EDF firmly under the control of EU institu-
tions, it has proposed an increase of 30% in its exter-
nal action budget to €123 billion (European Commission,
2018b). The Commission argues that budgetisation will
provide protection from the vulnerabilities of member
states declining aid commitments and provide more co-
herence, greater transparency, democratic scrutiny and
flexibility (European Commission, 2018b). The new pro-
posals are based on the Neighbourhood, Development
and International Cooperation Instrument, merging a
number of EU financing mechanisms into a geographic
pillar (with a focus on the neighbourhood and Sub-
Saharan Africa), a thematic pillar and a rapid response
pillar. In addition the proposals include an Investment
Framework for External Action, with an increased ‘fire-
power’ of up to €60 billion to help raise and leverage
additional private sector financial resources (European
Commission, 2018b).
The Commission’s decision to utilise the confluence
of Brexit, the renegotiation of the CPA and the MFF to
bring forward this reform demonstrates a degree of op-
portunism. Lightfoot, Mawdsley and Svent-Ivanyi (2017)
note that the Commission has long been ‘carving it-
self a role as coordinator of member state activities’,
and has signalled its intentions to increase its capacity
in this field. The opposition of the UK and other EU
Member states has been matched by the ACP who are
concerned this could herald a diminution of its aid allo-
cation. The ACP negotiating mandate for the post-2020
relationship therefore makes explicit its firm preference
for maintaining the EDF outside of the budget coupled
with an emphasis on budget support (ACP, 2018, p. 25).
While the coalition of opposition led to the failure of
the Commission’s previous attempts to budgetise the
EDF, for example in 2003 in advance of the 10th EDF
(European Commission, 2003), in the context of Brexit,
it has renewed its proposals.
Importantly the integration of the EDF into the bud-
get would make it difficult for the UK to continue to par-
ticipate in EU external relations. The principle of third-
party participation in EU development mechanisms is
already established through the financial innovations
that allow non-member states to channel their Overseas
Development Assistance (ODA) via the EU. The option
of maintaining UK EDF funding is broadly in line with
ACP preferences to open the post-Cotonou relationship
to third parties. Indeed, certain members states’ oppo-
sition to budgetisation reflects their desire to facilitate
the continuation of theUK’s contribution (Castillejo et al.,
2018, p. 10). The possibility of ongoing UK contributions
to the EDFwould limit the impact of Brexit on this area of
development policy. However, this prospect appears un-
likely, not least due to the reduced leadership capacity
the UK would inevitably have as an ‘outside’ contributor,
notwithstanding its demands to continue to shape policy
in return for its participation.
In light of the indeterminacy of the disintegrative
processes, there has been a tendency to focus on sce-
nario planning responses to the gaps left by the UK.
Institutionalist and liberal intergovernmentalist accounts
provide analyses of the extent to which the remaining
EU states and institutions ‘fill the gap’ left by the UK in
funding, policy leadership and policy orientation and/or
reshape EU development policy. Within this, the analy-
sis of whether Brexit represents the kind of critical junc-
ture that will induce radical change is key. However, it is
perhaps more fruitful to understand this disintegration
within a broader set of transformations associated with
the expansion of the world market and its inherent ten-
dency to crisis. Here the analysis of the anticipatory ad-
justments and discursive framings evident in the EU–ACP
relationship provide an alternate lens through which to
assess the dynamic effects of Brexit.
5. Anticipatory Adjustments and the Discursive
Dynamics in the EU–ACP Relationship
The focus on the anticipatory adjustments in advance of
Brexit speaks to Rosamond’s (2016, p. 868) analysis of dis-
integration as an indeterminate, messy and drawn out
process mediated by the EU’s multi-institutional game.
This uncertainty points to the way in which the effects of
Brexit on EU development policy will depend on the ad-
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justments made by both societal and institutional actors
(De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2019) In terms of the EU–ACP
relationship these anticipatory adjustments are increas-
ingly apparent in the EU’s sectoral and geographic orien-
tation and discursive dynamics.
5.1. Reorientation of Geographical and Sectoral Focus
Given the manner in which UK colonial relations have
shaped EU external relations, Brexit could herald a redi-
rection of the geographical focus of development policy,
posing a particular threat for Commonwealth ACP states.
Non-LDC states, such as those in the Caribbean, might
experience a reduction in aid due to close links to the
UK and the EU preference for a differentiated approach.
Laporte (Laporte et al., 2016) suggested “it might be dif-
ficult for the English-speaking Caribbean to find new al-
lies in Europe that will defend their case in Brussels”.
Furthermore, the absence of the UK from the MFF ne-
gotiations could mean a greater focus by the EU on mid-
dle income countries (Castillejo et al., 2018). Olivie and
Perez (2017) suggest that these potential impacts would
be compounded by a changing sectoral focus away from
social development to infrastructural development and
trade facilitation.
Early evidence of a changing geographical focus was
clear in the EU’s proposal to replace the CPA with three
distinct, differentiated regional partnerships within a
common umbrella agreement. This would maintain the
existing acquis without incurring significant financial costs
(EC & HRUFASP, 2016a, p. 3). These strengthened yet flex-
ible regional partnerships (EU–Africa, EU–Caribbean and
EU–Pacific) rely on an increased management role for as-
sociated regional organisations, and have a specific set
of regional themes. For Africa, this includes a focus on
migration and ‘mobility management’, reflecting the EU’s
growing concerns about immigration, security and the
pressures facing the Southern EU member states. For the
Caribbean, which was the first region to conclude an EPA
through the CARIFORUM–EU partnership, the specific fo-
cus is sustainability, climate change and natural disasters.
The EU’s relationswith the Pacific share a similar set of pri-
orities, highlighting the dependence of the region onmar-
itime security and ocean governance. The Pacific Islands
Forum has been identified as a key organisation in the fu-
ture management of EU–Pacific relations, although with-
out the basis of a region-wide EPA which has proved dif-
ficult to conclude and currently only includes Papua New
Guinea and Fiji.
While the EU’s preference for amore regionalised ap-
proach is longstanding, as evidenced in the EPA frame-
works, this has been greatly strengthened through the
post-Cotonou proposals and the pursuit of the Continent
to Continent (C2C) agreement to cement EU–African
Union relations. The EU’s proposals chime with those
of the African Union (AU) and its desire to ensure
African Unity and augment EU–AU relations (African
Union, 2018). This consensus produced the New Africa
Europe Alliance and is reinforced by the EU’s support
for African Continental Free Trade Area (ACFTA), which
includes increases in financial support from €7 mil-
lion (2014–2017) to €50 Million (2018–2020). The long-
term aim is to build a continent-to-continent EU–ACFTA
Agreement (European Commission, 2018a). The conflu-
ence of the preparations for the post-Cotonou negoti-
ations and for Brexit have therefore provided a unique
opportunity for the EU to secure and deepen its region-
alised approach to development, and particularly its re-
lations with Africa as a bloc. Its ongoing commitment to
principles of poverty reduction however is less certain.
Other dynamic effects of Brexit might become ev-
ident through strengthened ACP negotiating power.
While the collective ACP has remained committed to
maintaining the integrity of the Group, Brexit presents
an opportunity for individual states, regions and groups
to leverage their position in relation to the EU (Langan,
2016). With the UK potentially offering an alternative
set of trade relationships, ACP states could exact conces-
sions from both sides in order to secure their interests.
As such, Brexit could create dynamism in the behaviour
of third countries, as they seize the opportunity to max-
imise their positions and gain concessions from the EU.
This could signal a rebalancing of the historically asym-
metrical EU–ACP relations and limit the EU’s power to
push its own interests, either geographically or sectorally.
The disintegrative momentum therefore could provide
opportunity for the ACP to bring a more developmental
focus to the relationship and offset the socio-economic
pressures wrought through rapid trade liberalisation and
associated neo-liberal restructuring.
This potential shift towards more equitable relations
has however been countered by the Commission’s ex-
plicit desire to pursue its own preferences and self-
interest within the new relationship. “The general ob-
jective is to shape relations with the ACP countries af-
ter 2020 as to best achieve the EU’s interests” (EC &
HRUFASP, 2016a, p. 2). Furthermore, the EU’s region-
alised approach could facilitate the expansion of the EU’s
external relations. The regional pillar approach provides
the opportunity to extend the relationship beyond the
existing ACP members, for example to include North
African states, other non-ACP LDCs and small island de-
veloping states (EC & HRUFASP, 2016a, p. 3). Therefore,
the post-CPA presents an opportunity to expand the
global reach of the EU through and beyond existing
frameworks, and in doing so poses a particular challenge
to the global influence of the UK post-Brexit.
In the context of the EU’s intentions to deepen
and widen its links to Africa, the UK government has
also been signalling its desire to secure its position on
the continent. North Africa in particular is an emerging
arena of competition. In pursuit of its post-Brexit Global
Britain agenda, the UK is rapidly expanding its presence
throughout the continent. Former French colonies, such
as the rapidly growing frontier markets of Ivory Coast
and Senegal, have been identified as areas of interest,
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while new UK embassies have been established in Niger
and Chad. However, while these competing positions in-
dicate attempts to secure advantage in potentially lucra-
tive emerging markets and zones of influence, both the
UK and EU share common commitments to securing pro-
cesses of world market expansion and embedding ne-
oliberal reform (Price & Nunn, 2016, p. 454). Moreover,
the adoption and promotion of collectivised investment
facilities at the heart of both EU and UK development
funding provides opportunities for collaboration. The UK
stated that cooperation based on the collective manage-
ment of investments could be possible if the EUmatched
the UK’s agenda (Mordaunt, 2018). The extent to which
this would depend on the City of London’s expertise, and
the willingness of both the UK and EU to fund collec-
tive investments could determine the future shape of
their cooperation.
Both DFID and the Commission have enthusiasti-
cally supported and promoted collaborative financial
Innovations such as aid blending, which combine fund-
ing from various public and private channels to gener-
ate further investment and leverage large-scale finance
(EC & HRUFASP, 2016b, p. 111). EU aid blending mech-
anisms such as delegated cooperation and trust funds,
allow the participation of non-member states, for ex-
ample Norway and Switzerland, and offer possibilities
for future collaboration with a post-Brexit UK. Member
states and non-member states currently contribute to
facilities either directly or through investment organ-
isations. For example, PIDG, a key EU trust fund in-
vestor, is funded by UK aid in combination with the
Netherlands, Switzerland, Australia, Sweden, Germany
and the International Finance Corporation (PIDG, 2019).
While blended aid mechanisms have expanded rapidly
over the last decade, there has been a corresponding
decline in budgetary support (EC & HRUFASP, 2016b,
pp. 24–29). This shifting emphasis is in spite of the
Commission’s evaluation which found that budget sup-
port had been most effective in reducing extreme
poverty (EC & HRUFASP, 2016b, p. 93).
The current EDF incorporates two types of trust
funds: The Emergency and Post Emergency Trust Fund
and the Thematic Trust Funds. The Commission re-
emphasised its support for such mechanisms in the
recent New European Consensus of Development.
Examples include the EU–Africa Infrastructure Trust
fund, The Caribbean Investment Facility, The Investment
Facility for the Pacific, the Africa Investment Facility and
the European Fund for Sustainable Development which
provides investment guarantees from the EU budget
to lower the risks of the expansion of investment (EC &
HRUFASP, 2016b, p. 111). These are augmented by policy
innovations such as the 2018 Africa–European Alliance
for Sustainable Investment and Jobs which aimed to de-
risk investment and mobilise private sector financing in
Africa (European Commission, 2019, p. 49).
Aid blending has become a keymechanism for the EU
to deliver its interest driven development policy. While
there has been the strong promotion and proliferation of
these public/private finance innovations, Castillejo et al.
(2018) argue that there has been a lack of associated
mechanisms for reporting and scrutiny. Langan (2018,
p. 76) has argued that these mechanisms represent the
forms of ‘revolving credit’ highlighted in neo-colonialist
critiques, in which aid is channelled into initiatives that
offer opportunities for returns on capital for donor states
and allied business interests, often producing negative
consequences for labour and the environment and little
by way of poverty reduction.
5.2. The Discursive Dynamics of Brexit
Long-running neo-colonial and dependency critiques
have emphasised the material underpinnings of devel-
opment policy. In its most recent incarnation however
the framing of aid as an investment tool marks a novel
discursive turn in which the donor self-interest motive is
explicitly promoted and justified. This discourse, rooted
in deep material interests, is represented in EU and UK
development policy, in struggles to establish presence in
areas that were commonly shared prior to Brexit, and in
the assurances provided to domestic constituencies of
the value of development cooperation.
The ‘globalist discourse’ (Smith, 2019) of a resur-
gent Global Britain relies on a reformulation of develop-
ment policy that closely aligns with the interests of the
British state and business, as represented in the ‘Value
for Money’ mantra. This draws heavily on a discursive
reinvigoration of the Commonwealth that conjures the
notions of Empire and colonialism. Importantly this is
framed within a ‘Myth of Betrayal’ (Murray-Evans, 2016)
that ignores the relationships the UK maintained with
the Commonwealth through EU membership.
The UK’s willingness to express its desire to secure
material interests through the discourse of Value for
Money in development policy has been matched by the
EU. Within the context of enduring effects of global fi-
nancial crisis and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis
in Europe, large-scale migratory pressures, challenges of
rising populism and pressures on multilateralism, EU de-
velopment policy has been shaped by the need to as-
sure domestic constituencies that economic stability, mi-
gration and security threats are being addressed. The
discursive framing of development cooperation empha-
sises its potential to deliver returns to Europe and se-
cure the interests of its own citizens and businesses,
over the normative commitment to poverty reduction
or indeed any sense of post-colonial reparative justice.
This framing is increasingly necessary in order to garner
member state consensus over the future of EU devel-
opment policy, particularly where domestic constituen-
cies question policy and funding rationales. Castillejo
et al. (2018, p. 6) state that in spite of elements of dis-
cord between member states and EU institutions, there
is support for the promotion of EU interests, particu-
larly when tied to the sustainable provision of global
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public goods. Within this, concepts such as ‘sustainable
development’ and ‘poverty reduction’ act as important
legitimating discourses. However while Brexit produces
differing geo-economic imaginaries depending on the
way in which ideas are articulated, the EU’s commit-
ment to ongoing neoliberalisation is likely to be undis-
turbed by Brexit (Adler-Nissen, Galpin, & Rosamond,
2017, pp. 585–586), notwithstanding the driving role the
UK has played within the policies and narratives that
have structured its development policy.
6. Conclusion
Brexit has fundamental implications for the EU’s devel-
opment policies. The loss of the UK will create gaps in
funding and policy leadership, and could bring changes
to the geographic and sectoral focus of existing relations.
Anticipatory adjustments by leading member states, EU
institutions and partners have demonstrated the extent
to which the confluence of Brexit, the Multi-annual
Financial Framework and the EU–ACP negotiations have
provided opportunities for change. They also point to
the challenges the EU faces in addressing its strategic
deficit in policy making and in funding future develop-
ment cooperation.
While existing analyses offer insight into the institu-
tional impacts of Brexit in terms of filling the gaps left
by the UK, they tend to overlook the broader and more
fundamental shifts which are both reflective and consti-
tutive of disintegration. The relevance of a materialist
political economy approach helps locate the impacts of
Brexit within the context of crises and the pressures of
the expansion of global markets. By pointing to the antic-
ipatory adjustments being made in terms of a changing
geographic and sectoral focus and the discursive turn in
policymaking towards self-interest and securingmaterial
interests, we are better able to understand both the im-
pact that Brexit will have on development cooperation
and the EU–ACP relationship. Moreover, it throws light
on the impact of disintegration on the global role of the
EU and its future relations with the UK. While there is a
commonality in their commitment to neo-liberalisation
and the expansion of global markets and private invest-
ment, the extent to which their own interests are articu-
lated as national, regional or global will determine the fu-
ture of their relationship. Importantly, Nicolaïdis (2015)
reminds us that the pursuit of self-interest and key ma-
terial and ideational interests in the external relations of
the EU and its member states is not novel, but relies on
a collective amnesia about the historic and social condi-
tions that fashion contemporary North–South relations
and the asymmetries that underpin them. The extent to
which Brexit will resolve these remains uncertain.
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